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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Supreme Court of Utah has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by ruling that 
Appellants failed to establish a prima facie case of wrongful interference with 
economic relations? 
II. Did the trial court commit reversible error by ruling that Appellees 
did not wrongfully initiate the proceedings in the lower court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The same standard of review applies to both issues. It is set forth in 
Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); and Grayson Roper Ltd. 
vs. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) as follows: 
...[W]e review the trial court's legal conclusions under a 
correction-of-error standard according those conclusions 
no particular deference. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A- NATURE OF THE CASE 
A. Carter Davis and Shirleen Davis ("Davis") are Plaintiffs and 
Counterclaim Defendants in the trial court action, and Appellees in this 
appeal. Ideal Management Company, a trust, Jerry Huish, Trustee, and Jeny 
Huish, individually ("Huish") (collectively referred to as "Ideal") are 
Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs, and Appellants in this appeal. 
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In November 1992, Davis prepared and entered into an Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement for Residential Construction (the "Purchase Agreement") to 
purchase a new residence being constructed by Ideal at 1224 East 12 Pines 
Circle, Sandy, Utah (the "Property") for $183,000.00, conditional upon the sale 
of the Davis' house. 
In April, 1993, Mr. Davis told Mr. Huish that the Davises had not sold 
their house, and that the Davises could not and would not purchase the 
Property. As a result, Ideal listed the Property for sale with Wardley Realty. 
Thereafter, the Davises returned the key to the house to Mr. Huish. 
A few weeks later, the Davises received an offer on their house and 
Mrs. Davis called Mr. Huish to see if Ideal would still sell the Property to the 
Davises for the same amount set forth in the Purchase Agreement. Mr. Huish 
told Mrs. Davis that since the Davises had cancelled the Purchase Agreement 
and Ideal had listed the property, the Davises would have to make a new offer 
through Ideal's realtor. 
Rather than make an offer, Davis had an attorney demand that Ideal 
sell the Property to Davis or be sued. 
Ideal responded, advised the Davises' attorney that Ideal had received 
an offer of $209,00.00 from a third party and gave Davis an opportunity to 
match the offer. 
Davis did not match the offer. Instead, Davis filed suit to compel Ideal 
to sell the Property to Davis for $183,000.00. 
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Ideal answered the complaint denying that there was any contract or 
obligation to sell the Property to Davis. The trial court agreed. 
Thereafter, Ideal amended its counterclaim to assert wrongful 
interference with economic relations and wrongful initiation of the lawsuit. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On May 12, 1993, Davis commenced an action against Ideal by filing 
a complaint which sought to force Ideal to sell the Property to Davis for 
$183,000.00 and prevent Ideal from selling the property to any third party. A 
lis pendens was recorded. (R. 2). 
On May 24, 1993, Ideal filed a counterclaim alleging breach of 
contract, slander of title, and sought quiet title in the Property. (R. 20-46). 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. (R. 53-54, R. 100-
101, R. 141-142). Both motions were denied on October 6, 1993. (R. 198). 
An evidentiary hearing was held December 10, 1993, after which the 
Court ruled that there was no meeting of the minds under the Purchase 
Agreement, that no contract existed between the parties, and there was no 
basis to order Ideal to sell the Property to Davis. (R. 243). Thereafter, on or 
about January 27, 1994, counsel for Ideal filed a follow-up motion for 
summary judgment. (R. 252). Davis filed a counter-motion. (R. 282). A 
Minute Entry granted summary judgment to Ideal, quieting title in Ideal. (R. 
311-313). A partial summary judgment was signed on May 9, 1994, in favor 
of Ideal, declaring that the Lis Pendens "does not constitute a valid claim or 
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interest in [the Property]" and quieting title in Ideal. (R. 314-316) 
On April 7,1995, Ideal filed an amended counterclaim which included 
additional causes of action for (1) wrongful interference with prospective 
economic relations and (2) wrongful initiation of proceedings (R. 355-367), 
which claims were tried before the Honorable Tyrone Medley, without a jury, 
on May 3, 1995. 
C DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT 
At the conclusion of Ideal's presentation of its case at trial, and cross 
examination by Davises counsel, without hearing any evidence to dispute the 
facts presented by Ideal, the Court directed verdict against Ideal, holding that 
Ideal had failed to present facts sufficient to establish its claims for wrongful 
interference with prospective economic relations and wrongful filing of 
proceedings. The Court also required Ideal to pay back $3,000.00 to Davis. 
(R. 406-413). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. In November, 1992, Davis and Ideal entered the Purchase Agreement 
for the purchase of the Property, conditioned upon the sale of the Davises' house. 
(R.438-437) No realtor was involved. (On January 18,1994, the trial court found 
there was no meeting of the minds and the purported Purchase Agreement was 
unenforceable.) (R. 243). 
2. By early April, 1993, the Davises had not sold their house and when 
asked by Huish if the Davises intended to complete the purchase, Mr. Davis 
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specifically told Huish that the Davises were not going to purchase the Property. 
Mr. Davis also told Huish to relist or do whatever Ideal had to do to find another 
buyer. (R. 441, lines 7-18; also see R. 450, lines 14-25). Davis also gave the key 
to the Property back to Huish. (R. 443, lines 17 through R. 444, line 1) 
3. Ideal listed the Property for sale with a realtor. (R. 441, line 23, and R. 
442, line 1). 
4. Following the events described in paragraph 2, above, neither Mr. nor 
Mrs. Davis ever objected to Ideal posting or listing the Property for sale. (R. 444 
lines 2-5). 
5. Near the end of April, 1993, Mrs. Davis called Huish and said that the 
Davises had received an offer on the Davis house and the Davises wanted to 
purchase the Property for the Purchase Agreement amount. (R. 442, lines 1-4). 
6. Huish reminded Mrs. Davis that the Davises had withdrawn the offer 
to purchase, that there was no contract between the parties, that Ideal had incurred 
additional expenses, that Ideal had listed the Property, and that the Davises would 
have to contact Ideal's realtor if the Davises wanted to make an offer. Mrs. 
Davis said the Davises were going to sue Ideal if Ideal would not sell the Property 
for $183,000.00 to the Davises. Huish again advised Mrs. Davis that there were 
now realtor fees involved, that Ideal's agent was Dolly Howard and any offer 
Davis made would be considered. (R. 442 lines 4-20; also see R. 452 lines 21-
R. 453 line 6). 
7. Huish received a letter from the Davises counsel, Mr. Rogan, dated 
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April 29, 1993, demanding that Ideal sell the Property to Davis for $183,000.00 
or be sued. The letter also stated that the sale of the Davises' house would not 
close until around May 23, 1993. (R. 445 line 23 to R. 446 line 4; Exhibit D-6). 
8. On May 5, 1993, Huish received an offer from another buyer for a 
greater price than in the Purchase Agreement. (R. 445, lines 9-22; Exhibit D-7). 
9. On May 7, 1993, Ideal gave Davis notice of an offer from a third party 
to purchase the Property for $209,000.00, and gave Davis an opportunity to match 
the offer. Davis did not match the offer. (R. 446, line 20 - R. 447, line 7; Exhibit 
D-8). 
10. The Davises filed suit as threatened for the purpose of tying up the title 
to the Property to further their purpose of forcing Ideal to sell the Property to 
them under the terms of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 48 lines 11-18). 
11. Davis told Huish the suit was filed to prevent Ideal from selling the 
Property to anyone else. (R. 450 line 11 - R. 451 line 2). 
12. Ideal's follow-up motion for summary judgment was granted to Ideal 
in May 1994, quieting title in Ideal, (R. 314-316) after which Ideal was able to 
sell the Property. (R. 449 lines 13-17). 
13. At the trial of this matter, at the conclusion of evidence presented by 
Ideal, and after cross examination, without hearing any evidence in 
contravention of Ideal's case, the trial court ruled against Ideal on Ideal's claims 
for intentional interference with economic relations and for wrongful initiation of 
proceeding. (R. 406-413). 
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14. Evidence of damages was received via exhibits, but no testimony of 
damages was permitted because the trial court would not allow testiimony on the 
issue of damages in light of its decision to rule against Ideal on the issue of 
liability. (R. 434 lines 14 through R. 435 line 13; also see R. 449, lines 7-12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ideal has presented incontroverted evidence to support Ideal's claims that 
Davis (1) wrongfully interfered with Ideal's economic relations and (2) wrongfully 
initiated the lawsuit. 
After Davis reneged on its offer to purchase the Property, Ideal listed the 
Property for sale and found a buyer. Davis improperly held the Property hostage 
by filing suit against Ideal, clouding title, with the intent to injure Ideal. Davis 
thereby caused Ideal to suffer economic loss, for the purpose of forcing Ideal to 
sell the Property to Davis. Such "hostage taking" is tortious. Davis has 
intentionally interfered with Ideal's economic relations by wrongfully initiating the 
lawsuit with the primary purpose of tying up title to the Property and filing a lis 
pendens. 
ARGUMENT 
STATEMENT OF THE LAW APPLICABLE TO APPELLANTS' CLAIMS 
A. INTERFERENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized the tort of intentional interference 
with prospective economic relations in the case Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. 
vs. Isom. Utah, 657 P.2d 293 (1982). Therein, at page 304, the Utah Supreme 
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Court stated: 
...in order to recover damages, the plaintiff must prove (1) 
that the 
defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing 
or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the plaintiff. Id. 
at 304. 
Leigh was the seller of a furniture business to Isom. Leigh sued Isom to 
repossess the business, to terminate Isom's interest in the business, and to obtain 
a deficiency judgment. Isom counterclaimed for intentional interference with 
contractual relations. 
Leigh pursued some previously initiated lawsuits against Isom, causing 
Isom to incur the expense and effort of defending two groundless actions. Leigh 
also deliberately breached its contract with Isom, and the court found that the 
breach of the contract was for the purpose of injuring Isom. As a result, the 
Supreme Court of Utah found that Leigh purposefully acted to ruin Isom's 
business and obtain possession of the building. 
1. INTENT 
There is no question that the filing of the suit was intentional and for the 
purpose of interfering with Ideal's right to sell the Property. 
Huish testified that Mrs. Davis told Huish that the purpose of the suit was 
to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else. Thus, Mrs. Davis 
manifested her intent to interfere with Ideal's economic relations. The testimony 
before the court states: 
Q. (Mr. Elggren): "Did you have any discussions 
with the Davises to know what the purpose of the lawsuit 
was?" 
A. (Huish): "Well, Mrs. Davis said that she was 
going to prevent me from selling it to anybody else; it was 
her place. I said,' I beg your pardon, it is not your home. 
You failed on that contract/ And she got very persistent." 
Q. "So basically it is your understanding, if I'm 
interpreting this correctly, that the Davises were taking the 
action they took to prevent you from selling the property to 
any third person?" 
A. "Yes, it was." 
Q. "And the means by which they were taking this 
action was through the filing of the lawsuit; is that correct?" 
A. "Yes, after they said they didn't want the house." 
(R. 450 lines 11-25, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint 
R. 2) 
2. IMPROPER PURPOSE/IMPROPER MEANS 
In Leigh, the court elucidated "improper purpose" by stating 
"...improper purpose (or motive, intent, or objective) will support a cause 
of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations 
even where the defendant's means were proper." It concluded its analysis 
of the proof necessary to satisfy a showing of "improper purpose" by 
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stating: "...improper piupose will be satisfied where it can be shown that 
the actor's predominant purpose was to injure the plaintiff." Id. at 307. 
On page 308, the court continued; 
For example, in Alveska Pipeline Service Co.. 
Supra, the parties had a contract under which RCA 
provided a communications systems along with Alyeska's 
pipeline. RCA, in turn, contracted with Aurora to furnish 
air transportation along the route. About a year later, 
Aurora lost its contract with RCA when Alyeska elected to 
take over the air transportation function under a contract 
provision that permitted it to do so. Aurora thereupon 
sought damages from Alyeska, alleging that Alyeska's 
decision, which caused RCA to terminate its contract with 
Aurora, had been motivated by spite, resulting from an 
earlier payment dispute and litigation between Alyeska and 
Aurora. Alyeska pleaded that it had acted to further its 
own economic and safety interest. The Alaska Supreme 
Court upheld the jury verdict against Alyeska, explaining: 
[I]f one does not act in a good faith attempt 
to protect his own interest or that of another but, 
rather, is motivated by a desire to injure the 
contract party, he forfeits the immunity afforded by 
the privilege [Authorities cited]... In the case at bar, 
the central factual issue... was whether Alyeska was 
genuinely furthering its own economic and safety 
interests or was using them as a facade for 
inflicting injury upon Aurora. There was sufficient 
evidence upon which the jury could properly find 
that Alyeska was acting out of ill-will towards 
Aurora, rather than to protect a legitimate business 
interest, [emphasis added.] 
The Utah Supreme Court also held that the requirement of showing 
"improper means" was met by the plaintiff showing that it was forced to defend 
a groundless lawsuit. The court stated: 
By forcing Isom to defend what appear to have been 
two groundless lawsuits, the Leigh Corporation was clearly 
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employing an improper means of interference with Isom's 
business. Such use of civil litigation as a weapon to damage 
another's business, besides being an intolerable waste of 
judicial resources, may give rise to independent causes of 
action in tort for abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution. Id. at 309. 
In the present case, Mr. Davis told Huish that the Davises would not 
purchase the Property in April, 1993. (R 441 lines 4-18) The lower court 
affirmed that there was no contract between Davis and Ideal. Even after the lower 
court so ruled, Davis demonstrated an obstructive and dilatory intent to cause 
injury and expense to Ideal by refusing to release the lis pendens after the trial 
court found for Ideal. As a result, Ideal had to incur the expense of pursuing and 
obtaining summary judgment and an order of the trial court to have the cloud on 
the title removed. 
Before the trial court, Huish testified that Davis also told Huish that the 
purpose of the suit was to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else. 
Thus, Mrs. Davis manifested her intent to interfere with Ideal's economic relations. 
Q. (Mr. Elggren): "Did you have any discussions 
with the Davises to know what the purpose of the lawsuit 
was?" 
A. (Huish): "Well, Mrs. Davis said that she was 
going to prevent me from selling it to anybody else; it was 
her place. I said,' I beg your pardon, it is not your home. 
You failed on that contract/ And she got very persistent." 
Q. "So basically it is your understanding, if I'm 
11 
interpreting this correctly, that the Davises were taking the 
action they took to prevent you from selling the property to 
any third person?" 
A. "Yes, it was." 
Q. "And the means by which they were taking this 
action was through the filing of the lawsuit; is that correct?" 
A. "Yes, after they said they didn't want the house." 
(R. 450 lines 11-25, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint 
R.2) 
As Mr. Huish testified at the trial, after suit had been filed and the trial 
court found no contract between Ideal and Davis, Ideal requested that the lis 
pendens be removed so that the Property could be sold. Mr. Huish testified: 
Q. (Elggren): Now with respect to the events that 
followed, did the Davises ever release the property to you 
to allow you to sell the same? 
A. (Huish): No, they did not. After repeated 
requests, and even after the court found there was no 
contract between us because of a "no meeting of the 
minds," and we requested specifically that they release the 
lis pendens, they still maliciously held us hostage and 
would not release the property to the owner. (R. 448, lines 
19-25, R. 449, lines 1-2) 
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The facts before the trial court showed that the primary purpose of the suit 
filed by Davis was to injure Ideal. Davis sought to hold the Property hostage and 
prevent the sale of the Property to any third party. Such action was clearly to 
inflict injury upon Ideal, and thereby attempt to force Ideal to sell the Property to 
the Davises at a time after which Davis had clearly cancelled and withdrawn the 
Davises offer to purchase, (R. 441 lines 7-18; also R. 450 lines 14-25). 
On cross examination by Davises' counsel, the fact that the Purchase 
Agreement was not considered by Davis to be in effect was further affirmed. 
Q. (Mr. Rogan): "And Mrs. Davis said to you that 
she and her husband were going to sue you?'' 
A (Huish): "Yes, that was a threat." 
Q. "Did you respond as you testified by saying, 
'Our contract with you is over'?" 
A. "Yes, I did." 
Q. "Was that statement that you made based upon 
legal counsel, or was that your own opinion?" 
A. "No, that is what Mr. Davis told me. He said he 
wasn't going to buy the house. It was over and done and 
I could sell it to someone else." 
Q. "So your conversation was based on your 
understanding of what Mr. Davis told you, that they weren't 
going to buy the house?" 
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A. "Exactly/' (R. P. 453, lines 11-25) 
In Top Service Body Shop. Inc. vs. Allstate Ins. Co., 582 P.2d 1365 (Or 
1977) at page 1371, the Oregon Supreme Court discussed improper means as an 
element of wrongful interference with economic relations.. In footnote 11, it 
stated: 
11. Commonly included among improper means are 
violence, threats or other intimidation, deceit or 
misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood, (our emphasis.) 
As set forth above, the Davises threatened and did file an unfounded action 
with the trial court. Such action constitutes "improper means". 
In a factually similar case, GS Enterprises v. Falmouth Marine. 571 N.E. 
2d 1363 (Mass. 1991), that court found facts supporting a finding of intentional 
interference with economic relations. In that action, the defendant ("FMI") filed 
a law suit and lis pendens that temporarily interfered with the performance of a 
contract. The plaintiff, ("GSEI") had a contract with FOREI. At pages 1369 and 
1370, the court states: 
It is undisputed that GSEI had a contract with 
FOREI, and that FMI's lawsuit and lis pendens at least 
temporarily interfered with the performance of that contract. 
Therefore, like the motion judge and the parties, we focus 
on whether there is a genuine dispute regarding the 
propriety of FMI's suit, and whether there is a genuine 
dispute regarding harm to GSEI because of the interference 
with the contract. 
To determine whether a particular act that interferes 
with contractual relations of a plaintiff and a third party is 
14 
improper, it is necessary to consider whether the act had an 
improper motive or constituted an improper means, 
(citations omitted.) 
In this case, however, the means in question 
consisted of a lawsuit, an act which is subject to evaluation 
against objective standards. It is clear, for example, that a 
party is justified in interfering in a third-party's contract 
with another by filing a lawsuit in a good faith effort to 
assert legally protected rights. See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, supra at section 773. At the same time, however, a 
civil action is wrongful if its initiator does not have 
probable cause to believe that the suit will succeed, and is 
acting primarily for a purpose other than that of properly 
adjudicating his claims. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
section 674(a) (1977). 
In this case, there was evidence on the record that 
FMI was motivated primarily to prevent land developers 
from obtaining the property. An FMI principal testified that 
FMI originally became interested in buying MacDougalls' 
to "protect" it from development 
In sum as we review the materials before the motion 
judge, there are presented jury questions as to whether FMI 
was motivated simply by a spiteful desire to block 
development, and whether FMI sued FOREI in bad faith 
and without probable cause to believe that the action 
would succeed, rather than to assert legitimate rights. If 
accepted by a fact-finder, GSEFs evidence would satisfy the 
Geltman requirement of intentional interference that is 
improper in motive or means, (compare Leigh Furniture & 
Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d. 293, 306-307 (Utah 1982).... 
(our emphasis) 
In the present case, the trial court failed to properly apply the law 
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Leigh and should be reversed. The 
Purchase Agreement had unequivocally been terminated by the Davises. The 
Davises could not thereafter reasonably believe that they had a good-faith purpose 
in filing suit. 
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3. CAUSING INJURY TO IDEAL 
The trial court refused to receive testimony as to damages, because it ruled 
Davis had not acted wrongfully in filing suit even though Davis had told Ideal the 
offer was withdrawn,, The fact that damges were suffered by Ideal is undisputed 
on the record and evidence of damages was received in the form of Exhibits D-14 
through D-18. 
B. WRONGFUL INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS 
Abuse of process is actionable in Utah, Crease v. Pleasant Grove City. 519 
P.2d 888 (Utah 1974). Crease arose because Pleasant Grove City had fined 
Crease and jailed him for failure to pay a sewer charge. Crease sued the city. 
The question on appeal was whether there was a reasonable basis to sustain a 
cause of action for abuse of process. At page 890, the Court stated as follows: 
(FN 3) It is to be conceded that even though an 
action may have been properly initiated, and even though 
the process (the commitment) was lawfully issued, if it was 
used for an ulterior purpose for which it was not intended. 
that could be found to be actionable as an abuse of process 
(FN 4). This is so because the essence of that cause of 
action is a perversion of the process to accomplish some 
improper purpose, such as compelling its victim to do 
something which he would not otherwise be legally 
obligated to do. (our underlining) 
In the instant case, Ideal was not obligated to sell the Property to Davis 
because Davis had backed out of and cancelled the Purchase Agreement in April 
of 1993. (R. 441 lines 14-15; R. 451 lines 21 through 452 line 9) As such, the 
filing of the suit itself, in an attempt to compel Ideal "to do something which 
[Ideal] would not otherwise be legally obligated to do", is an abuse of process. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in the case Hansen vs. Kohler. 550 P2d 186 
(Utah 1976), held that although the filing of a lis pendens is privileged, an action 
may be maintained for damages arising out of the law suit and lis pendens. In 
Hansen the court quoted extensively and with approval Restatement, Torts, Section 
638, Comment c, stating, in relevant part: 
One against whom civil or criminal proceedings are 
initiated may recover in an action for the wrongful initiation 
of the proceedings, under the rule stated in sections 674 to 
680, if the proceedings have terminated in his favor and 
were initiated without probable cause and for an improper 
purpose. Id. at 190. 
Restatement, Torts, Section 674, states: 
One who initiates or procures the initiation of civil 
proceedings against another is liable to him for the harm 
done thereby if 
(a) the proceedings are initiated 
(i) without probable cause, and 
(ii) primarily for a purpose other than that of 
securing the adjudication of the claim on which 
the proceedings are based, and 
(b) except where they are ex parte, the proceedings 
have terminated in favor of the person against whom they 
are brought. 
Restatement, Torts, Section 675, states: 
One who initiates civil proceedings against another 
has probable cause for so doing if he reasonably 
believes in the existence of the facts upon which his 
claim is based, and 
(a) reasonably believes that under such facts 
the claim may be valid at common law or 
under an existing statute, or 
(b) so believes in reliance upon the advise of 
counsel given under the conditions stated in 
Section 666. 
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Section 666 relates to the wrongful filing of criminal proceedings. That 
is not applicable in this particular case. 
In the present case, Ideal showed that the Davises' predominate purpose in 
bringing the lawsuit was not to prove the facts alleged; rather, the predominate 
purpose was to stop the sale of the Property to a "anybody else", (R. 450 lines 
11-14) which would injure Ideal. 
Restatement, Torts, Section 676, states: 
To subject a person to liability under the rule stated 
in Section 674, the proceedings must have been initiated 
primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the 
adjudication of the claim on which they are based. 
By way of illustration of the meaning of Section 676, the comment thereto states: 
Illustration: 
1. A has purchased at sheriffs sale Blackacre subject 
to a statutory right of redemption in B, the original owner 
of Blackacre. B is negotiating a mortgage on Whiteacre in 
order to put himself in funds in order to exercise his right 
of redemption. A brings an action against B attacking B's 
title to Whiteacre in order to prevent the redemption of 
Blackacre. The purpose for which the action is brought is 
improper. 
Section 681 of Restatement of Torts deals with damages. It states as 
follows: 
When the essential elements of a cause of action 
stated in §674 have been established, the plaintiff is entitled 
to recover for 
(a) the harm normally resulting from any arrest or 
imprisonment, or any dispossession or interference 
with the advantageous use of his land, chattels or 
other things, suffered by him during the course of 
the proceedings, and 
(b) the harm to his reputation by any defamatory 
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matter alleged as the basis of the proceedings, and 
(c) the expense which he has reasonably incurred 
in defending himself against the proceedings, and 
(d) any specific pecuniary loss which has resulted 
from the proceedings, and 
(e) any distress which is caused by the proceedings 
The comment on Clause (a) states: 
b. Where the initiation of civil proceedings 
causes the arrest or imprisonment of the defendant or 
dispossession of his land, chattels or other things, the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover the same damages as 
though his arrest, imprisonment or dispossession was 
caused by any other tortious means. Therefore, it includes 
the harm which normally results from any of these and 
which, therefore, is assumed to have been suffered in the 
particular case. In addition, the plaintiff is entitled to 
recover under the rule stated in Clause (d), damages to 
compensate him for any pecuniary loss or other material 
harm which has been caused by his arrest or dispossession 
of his things or the interference with his advantageous use 
of them. 
With respect to Clause (d), the comment states: 
e. If, in addition to the elements of damage above 
enumerated, the plaintiff can prove any other loss of a 
pecuniary character which has resulted from the initiation 
of the civil proceedings, he is entitled to recover therefor. 
Such loss usually results from the harm done to the 
plaintiffs reputation by the defamatory character of the 
matter alleged as the basis of the proceedings or from his 
imprisonment or the deprivation of his possession of his 
land or chattels or other things. Thus, the harm for which 
he can recover includes any business or other loss which 
he sustains during his imprisonment and the loss of an 
opportunity to sell a thing of which he is dispossessed.... 
So too, one against whom another has wrongfully obtained 
an injunction which prevents him from making 
advantageous use of his land, chattels or other things or 
from carrying on his legitimate business activities, is 
entitled to recover the loss which he has thereby sustained, 
(our emphasis) 
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Costs and attorney's fees are included within those damages, (see footnotes 
to Clause (d).) 
The filing of the suit by Davis was wrongful because the Davises filed the 
lawsuit solely for the purpose of preventing Ideal from being able to sell 
Ideal's property. 
At trial, Huish testified that Mrs. Davis told Ideal that the purpose of the 
suit was to prevent Ideal from selling the property to anybody else, even though 
Mr. Davis had admitted to Mr. Huish that he knew the Purchase Agreement had 
been terminated. (R. 453 lines 14-25). That testimony is incontroverted. Thus, 
the Davises manifested their intent to injure Ideal by filing suit. (R. 450 lines 11-
25, R. 451 line 1-2) ( Also see Complaint R. 2) 
The Davises' malicious intent to cause injury was further revealed by their 
failure to release claims even after the court ruled against Davis in December 
1993. Ideal requested that the lis pendens be removed so that the Property could 
be sold. Davis refused. (R. 448, lines 19-25, R. 449, lines 1-2) Not until Ideal's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted, in May 9, 1994, 1993, (R. 
314) was the cloud on the title removed, even though the trial court declared there 
was no contract in January 1994. 
In summary, the Davises' expressed motive, i.e., to injure Ideal if Ideal 
would not agree to reinstate the Purchse Agreement, was manifested by the 
Davises' own admissions which are ^incontroverted. As a result, Ideal is entitled 
by law to be compensated for Ideal's losses and expenses resulting from the 
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wrongful initiation of proceedings by the Davises. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court has misapplied the law as set forth in Leigh Furniture v. 
Isom 657 P.2d 293 (Utah, 1982), and has condoned the hostage taking by Davis 
after receiving the uncontroverted evidence set forth above. 
The case law stated above supports Ideal's position that the Davises' actions 
were wrongful. Ideal clearly established by uncontroverted evidence that the 
Davises' expressed motive was to injure Ideal by filing and maintaining suit. 
Courts should not tolerate such "hostage taking." Ideal was deprived of the use of 
the Property for over one year because of the Davises' suit. The Davises should 
not be permitted to walk away from damages caused by them without 
compensating Ideal for the losses Ideal suffered. 
Dated this \ I day of September, 1995. 
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE 
STEPHEN B. ELGGREN 
Stephen B. Elggren 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Thomas F. Rogan 
136 South Main St. Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
STEPHEN B. ELGGRr.«V 




EXHIBIT 1: FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Thomas F. Rogan (4506) 
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and 
Shirleen C. Davis 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 801-3 55-04 61 
Third Judicial District 
MAY 2 5 1995 
SALT LAAc . \ECOUN"iY 
Deputy CO** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Plaintiffs 
-vs-
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants 
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
-vs-
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Counterclaim Defendants 




Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Before coming to trial on May 5, 1995, the Court ad-
dressed substantive issues raised in this matter on two 
occasions: the first, by Minute Entry on January 18, 1995, 
after having determined that the Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment of Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs. Davis was ambiguous on 
its face and after having received extrinsic evidence at 
-1-
a hearing on December 10, 1994, to resolve the ambiguity of 
the Agreement; and the second, ruling on Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment by granting partial declaratory relief 
to quiet title based on the Court's January Minute Entry. 
Now having considered further evidence at trial on 
May 5, 1995, the Court enters Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law as follow. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Court provided the parties an with ex-
pedited hearing on December 10, 1994, to consider extrinsic 
evidence in an effort to resolve the ambiguous Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement ("the Agreement") between Mr. Huish 
and Mr. and Mrs. Davis. 
2. The evidence presented at the hearing 
showed that the parties had substantially different under-
standings with regard to the price which would be paid 
for the property which was the subject of the Agreement 
and thus failed to resolve the ambiguity of the Agreement. 
3. The payment terms and price to be paid for 
the property were material elements of the parties' Agree-
ment. 
4. Given the lack of agreement on these mater-
ial elements, there was no meeting of the minds between 
the parties to the Agreement. 
5. On May 12, 1993, Mr. and Mrs. Davis through 
counsel filed suit and recorded with the Office of the Salt 
-2-
Lake County Recorder a Lis Pendens giving notice of the 
pendency of this action and the relief sought by them. 
6. On May 21, 1993, Mr, Huish through counsel 
demanded under Utah Code Section 38-9-1 that the plain-
tiffs remove the Lis Pendens. 
7. The Plaintiffs recorded the Lis Pendens 
in good faith and upon the advice of counsel to preserve 
what they believed to be their right to pursue the remedy 
of specific performance under the Agreement. 
8. The Plaintiffs intentionally filed this 
law suit and recorded the Lis Pendens. 
9. The recording of the Lis Pendens inter-
fered with the prospective economic relations of the 
Defendants• 
10. The Plaintiffs did not act for an improper 
purpose or by an improper means when they filed the law 
suit or recorded the Lis Pendens. 
11. The Plaintiffs were acting within their 
rights by initiating this law suit. 
12. The Plaintiffs deposited $3,000 as earnest 
money under their Agreement with Mr. Huish. 
14. By the terms of the Agreement, Mr. Huish 
was to return the $3,000 deposit to the Plaintiffs if 
they were unable to complete the transaction under the 
terms of the Agreement deemed ambiguous by the Court. 
15. Mr. Huish has not returned the $3,000 
-3-
earnest money deposit to the Plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. As previously determined by the Court: 
(a) the Agreement between Mr. Huish and Mr. and Mrs. 
Davis is ambiguous on its face; 
(b) there was no contract between Mr. Huish and Mr. 
and Mrs. Davis; and 
(c) title has been quieted in favor of Mr. Huish. 
2. Mr. and Mrs. Davis have not slandered 
Defendants' title to the property. 
3. Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable for 
interfering with the prospective economic advantage 
of the Defendants. 
4. Mr. and Mrs. Davis are not liable to 
the Defendants' by reason of their having filed this 
law suit. 
5. The Defendants are not entitled to recover 
damages from Mr. and Mrs. Davis. 
6. However, Mr. and Mrs Davis are entitled to 
recover from the Defendants their $3,000 earnest money 
which has not been returned to them. 
DATED this * Q day of May, 1995. 
EXHIBIT 2: ORDER 
Thomas F. Rogan (4506) 
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and 
Shirleen C. Davis 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 8 01-3 55-04 61 
Third Judicial District 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Plaintiffs 
-vs-
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants 
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
-vs-
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 




Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
On this ^)cj day of May, 1995, this Court made 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter 
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the defendants re-
cover nothing from the plaintiffs under the Complaint and 
Counterclaim and that judgment be entered in favor of the 
-1-
plaintiffs against the defendants for $3,000, each party-
bearing its own costs and attorney's fees. 
SO ORDERED, this GJ-& day of May, 1995. 
Uvc£ 
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•* k « 
JUDGEMENT 
Thomas F. Rogan (4506) 
Attorney for A. Carter Davis and 
Shirleen C. Davis 
13 6 South Main Street, Suite 325 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: 8 01-3 55-04 61 
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STATE OF UTAH 
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 
DAVIS, HIS SPOUSE, 
Plaintiffs 
-vs-
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY 
Defendants 
IDEAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, A TRUST, 
JERRY HUISH, TRUSTEE; AND 
JERRY HUISH INDIVIDUALLY, 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
-vs-
A. CARTER DAVIS AND SHIRLEEN C. 






Judge Tyrone E. Medley-
As order by the Court on the ^)ff day of May, 1995, 
IT IS NOW ADJUDGED as follows in this matter: 
1. Judgment is entered in favor of the Plain-
tiffs and against the Defendants for $3,000. 
2. Each party is to bear its own costs and 
-1-
attorney's fees, 
DATED this d a y of May, 1995 
BY ?$E COURT 
UKE 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
On this 15th day of May, 1995, I delivered by 
first-class U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a copy of 
these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Order, 
and Judgment to Stephen B. Elggren, Elggren & Van Dyke, 
2469 E. Fort Union Boulevard, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84121-3343. 
